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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between public capital expenditure and public debt in the 
European Union (EU), relying on a panel of fifteen countries over the sample period 1980-2013. 
We find robust evidence of a negative cointegrating relation, according to which increases in the 
capital expenditure-GDP ratio cause reductions in the debt-GDP ratio in the long run. Our empirical 
results suggest that current EU fiscal austerity can trigger upward debt spirals if cuts in total 
expenditure disregard its composition. Consistently with the “golden rule of public finance”, EU 
fiscal rules should allow for higher levels of capital expenditure in order to foster debt consolidation 
through growth dividends. 
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1. Introduction 
The European sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2012 has led to widespread concerns over the issue of 
fiscal sustainability in the European Union (EU). The austerity measures prescribed by the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty, in force since 2013, are regarded by a number of influential European policy 
makers as the most appropriate “exit strategy” to rule out explosive dynamics in the debt to GDP 
ratio. Fiscal retrenchment appears to be essential to guarantee debt consolidation and preserve 
governments’ solvency. In the present context, with a tax burden close to 1/2 of the GDP for several 
EU countries (Eurostat, 2014), around the top of the “Laffer curve” (??????????????????????????
?????, expenditure cuts are periodically advocated in order for high debt to GDP ratios to embark 
on dynamic paths leading to the 60-percent Maastricht reference value. 
However, the composition of expenditure cuts may critically influence fiscal consolidation 
processes (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997). In particular, fiscal adjustments characterized by 
permanent reductions in public capital expenditure to achieve budgetary targets may crowd out the 
economy’s rate of economic growth, consistently with both empirical evidence (Aschauer, 1989; 
Iwamoto, 1990; Barro, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and endogenous growth models (e.g., 
Futagami, Morita and Shibata, 1993), hence potentially deteriorating the long-run fiscal position 
(Yakita, 2008; Kondo, 2012). 
Along these lines, EU fiscal rules have historically been questioned since the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, for they abstract from the so-called “golden 
rule of public finance”, which excludes public investments from the deficit ceiling (e.g., Modigliani 
et al., 1998; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004). In the context of endogenous growth models with 
productive public capital, the golden rule is found to generate growth-enhancing effects with respect 
to fixed deficit rules in the spirit of the EU fiscal policy framework?????????, 2010). 
In this paper we analyze the dynamic relationship between public capital expenditure and 
public debt in the EU over the period from 1980 to 2013. We employ unit root and panel 
cointegration testing techniques, allowing for the possibility of endogenous structural breaks, to 
investigate the scope for convergent debt trajectories induced by fiscal stimulus aimed at enhancing 
public capital. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of fifteen countries – EU(15) – including 
members of the EU throughout the whole sample period 1980-2013 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), countries 
which joined the EU during the 1980s and 1990s (Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain), and 
Norway, which is closely associated with the EU by its membership of the European Economic 
Area. We further concentrate on the PIIGS group of countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain), because of the alleged greater fragility of their public finances. 
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We find strong evidence of a significantly negative cointegrating relation between public 
capital expenditure and public debt, evaluated in terms of ratios to GDP, in conjunction with a uni-
directional causality whereby capital expenditure Granger-causes debt. This empirical finding 
applies to both EU(15) and the subset of PIIGS countries. The evidence for a negative debt response 
to increases in capital expenditure shows extensive robustness especially from 1993 to 2003, due to 
the occurrence of structural breaks in the individual series over the early 1990s, when the 
Maastricht Treaty was approved and entered into force.  
Our empirical results have two significant policy implications. The EU emphasis on 
reducing total public expenditure to sustain fiscal adjustments can be counter-productive, since it 
does not account for the critical link between the composition of public expenditure and the success 
of a fiscal consolidation plan. Permanent reductions in the debt to GDP ratio would require higher 
levels of capital expenditure, since they provide governments with “growth dividends” which 
reinforce the long-term stance of fiscal policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the economic rationales behind the 
possible occurrence of a negative relationship between public capital expenditure and public debt. 
Section 3 presents the empirical results based on panel cointegration tests. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Capital expenditure and public debt sustainability 
Our central purpose in this paper is to infer the scope for strengthening the sustainability of EU 
public finances through rising public expenditure in assets, such as, for example, investments in 
technology and infrastructures. It is worth emphasizing that a negative relationship between public 
capital expenditure and public debt might occur, in theory, when one considers the variables either 
in levels at constant prices or as ratios to GDP. 
For real variables, two opposite indirect mechanisms interact. On the one hand, higher 
public capital expenditure can enlarge the tax base, due to the implied fiscal stimulus on output (e.g., 
Tuladhar and Bruckner, 2010), thereby expanding fiscal revenues. On the other hand, higher public 
capital expenditure can increase the long-run real interest rate, due to the alleged rise in the 
marginal productivity of private capital (Bruce and Turnovsky, 1999; ???????, 2010), thus 
exacerbating the debt service. A necessary condition for real debt to decline is that the first effect 
prevails on the second. 
For variables scaled by GDP, however, a third additional indirect mechanism is at work. 
Consistently with a fairly well-established literature, mentioned in the Introduction, rising public 
capital expenditure induces an increase in the long-run growth rate, which per se tends to dampen 
the after-growth real interest rate. It follows that, if the “growth dividend” is sufficiently 
pronounced to bring about a negative after-growth real interest rate, the law of motion of the debt to 
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GDP ratio turns to be fundamentally altered: intrinsically unstable dynamics are reversed in 
intrinsically stable dynamics. In this case, “honest” Ponzi games (Buiter, 1985) are even possible: 
deficits do not necessarily imply increases in the debt to GDP ratio, since they can always be 
financed by growth dividends (e.g., Bohn, 2008). 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Data 
The paper examines public capital expenditure and public debt over the period 1980-2013 and 
separately over the sub-periods 1980-1991 and 1993-2013, to consider the effects on fiscal policy of 
the Maastricht Treaty which was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1993. The data on public 
debt and public capital expenditure have been obtained from the AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic 
Data) database of the European Commission1. The general government public debt is here defined 
as the sum of all the internal liabilities of the central and regional governments. The variables have 
been considered both in real terms in 2005 prices, and as ratios to GDP in current market prices. All 
the data series have been transformed into logarithms in order to allow for possible non-linearities2 
and to achieve stationarity in variance. 
 Most countries in the sample experienced an increase in public debt and in public capital 
expenditure in real terms from 1980 to 2013 (Figures 1 and 2). For most countries, however, the 
increase in capital expenditure was proportionally lower than the increase in public debt, capital 
expenditure also typically declined as a ratio to GDP (Tables 1a and 1b). From Table 2, the 
correlation coefficient between public capital expenditure and debt is negative for almost all the 
countries in the sample, with the exceptions of Greece, Spain, UK and the Netherlands. The largest 
negative correlations were experienced in Austria, Italy, and Portugal. 
 Tables 3a and 3b report Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowsky, 
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) tests with a constant and trend for individual unit roots on the 
ratio of government debt and capital expenditure to GDP. The tests reject the null of non-
stationarity for variables (and vice versa in case of KPSS tests) in first differences for most of the 
countries in the sample. The ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the case of 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, and the PP test cannot reject the null of a unit root for Italy 
and Spain. These results are in line with those reported by Afonso and Rault (2010) for the period 
1970-2006. The first difference of real public debt in Table 4a yields similar results, with the ADF 
test unable to reject the null of a unit root for Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain and the PP 
test unable to reject the null of non-stationarity for Spain only. The KPSS test supports the null of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 The Appendix lists all the variable definitions and their AMECO source codes. 
2 See, e.g., Sarno (2001), Legrenzi and Milas (2013), and Piergallini and Postigliola (2013). 
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stationarity for all countries, for the above mentioned variables. For the capital expenditure-GDP 
ratio and the real capital expenditure series, all the three sets of test statistics confirm first-
difference stationarity for all the countries (the only exception being the PP test for real capital 
expenditure for Greece: see Table 4b). 
 Unit root tests therefore confirm that most of the variables under analysis can be regarded as 
stationary in first differences. Further analyses of the series however show that numerous series 
exhibit structural breaks over the sample period. We computed the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test 
for one unknown break point, and the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) test for two structural breaks in 
level and trend. When one considers the common breaks for the two tests, structural breaks for the 
debt-GDP ratio are found for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Spain in 1993-94, Finland, France 
and Italy in 1992-94, Germany in 1985-86, and Norway in 2002 (Table 5a). When one looks at the 
capital expenditure-GDP ratio, structural breaks can be seen for Denmark in 1993-94, Luxembourg 
in 1992, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway in 1991, France and Spain in 1989-90, Portugal in 1987, 
and UK in 1998 (Table 5b). A similar picture emerges from the analysis of the series in 2005 prices. 
Table 5c shows that a break was experienced in the real government debt series in Denmark and 
Finland in 1993-94, in Luxembourg and Norway in 1991, and in Germany in 1989. From Table 5d, 
the real expenditure series experienced structural breaks in Belgium and Luxembourg in 1991 and 
in Finland and Greece in 1986-88. 
 Most of the structural breaks therefore occurred during the period 1991-94, when the fiscal 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty came into force. This is relevant for policy analysis, since the 
resulting change in the fiscal regime could have yielded different long-run equilibrium relationships 
for the variables considered. No significant structural breaks were instead associated with the recent 
2007-08 financial crisis. 
 In addition to individual unit root tests, the panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), ADF-Fisher Chi-square, PP-Fisher Chi 
square, and Hadri (2000) were also implemented (Tables 6a and 6b). Most of these tests also 
confirm the stationarity of the first-differenced series, both for EU(15) and for the subset of PIIGS 
countries, with the only exceptions of the Hadri z- statistic for EU(15) and for PIIGS, and of the 
Breitung t-statistic for PIIGS. 
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3.2. Public capital expenditure and debt dynamics 
Table 7a presents the results of cointegration analysis between public capital expenditure and 
government debt for the panel of EU(15) countries over the sample period 1980-2013. The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is tested both for the variables as ratios to GDP and for variables at 
constant prices. The Pedroni (1999, 2000, 2004) tests allow for heterogeneity among the individual 
members of the panel, and for both the long-run cointegrating vectors and the short-run dynamics. 
Seven statistics, four pooled (“within-dimension”) and three group-mean (“between-dimension”) 
are reported. The Fisher tests were proposed by Johansen (1998), and Maddala and Wu (1999), and 
apply Fisher’s (1932) meta-analysis approach to combine p-values from independent tests, with r 
being the number of cointegrating vectors under the null. The Kao (1999) test extends the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach, with strict exogeneity of regressors 
with respect to errors being assumed. 
The only evidence in favour of cointegration from Table 7a comes from the Fisher tests (r<0 
and r<1) and, for real variables, from the Pedroni (1999) panel v-statistic. The reason for the 
rejection of the cointegration relationship lies in the structural breaks in the individual series that 
occurred during the early 1990s which were discussed in section 3.1, and that took place around the 
time of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. Tables 1b and 1c carry out the cointegration 
analysis separately for the sub-periods 1980-1991 and 1993-2013. There is weak evidence in favour 
of cointegration during the first sub-period. The Pedroni panel ADF-statistics and group ADF-
statistics and the Fisher tests all reject the null of no cointegration both for variables in ratios and at 
constant prices: for the former the null is also rejected by the Pedroni panel v-statistics and by the 
Kao (1999) test, whilst for the latter the null is also rejected by the Pedroni panel PP-statistic and 
the group PP-statistic. The summary results for the post-Maastricht sub-period 1993-2013 are 
presented in Table 7c. The evidence in favour of cointegration is now much stronger, with almost 
all tests (with the exception of the Pedroni panel v-statistics and group rho-statistics) supporting the 
existence of a long-run relationship between capital expenditures and debt. 
 Table 7d presents the results for the PIIGS countries over the whole sample period 1980-
2013. The evidence in favour of the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships for this sub-set 
of countries is only weak, with three tests supporting cointegration for the variables in ratios (the 
Pedroni panel ADF-statistic and the two Fisher tests) and with five test supporting cointegration for 
the variables at constant prices (the Pedroni group ADF-statistic and the Kao test, in addition to the 
previous three tests). The evidence in favour of cointegration is however much stronger over the 
more recent sub-period 1993-2013. Table 7e shows that nine out of ten tests are significant for 
variables in levels, and five out of ten for variables as ratios to GDP. 
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 Table 8 shows Kao’s (1999) Fully-Modified OLS coefficients for EU(15) and for the PIIGS 
countries. The coefficients describe the long-run relationship between the cointegrating variables. 
The coefficients are negative across all the specifications and the sample periods considered. Their 
values are always highly significant for the variables as ratios to GDP. The only exception is for 
PIIGS countries over the post-Maastricht period 1993-2013. When the relationship between the 
variables is estimated at constant prices, the negative coefficient is only significant for the whole 
sample of fifteen EU countries for the sub-period 1980-1991 and for the PIIGS countries over 1993-
2013. This suggests, as the discussion of Section 2 indicates, that the “growth dividend” is likely to 
constitute the main channel through which higher capital expenditure strengthens fiscal 
consolidation. Such a channel explains transparently why higher values of public capital 
expenditure tend to be associated with systematically lower levels of government debt when the 
variables are evaluated as ratios to GDP and not at constant prices. 
 Table 9a presents the results of Granger-causality tests on the direction of the relationship 
between capital expenditure and debt. Capital expenditure always Granger-causes public debt, both 
as a ratio to GDP and in constant prices. By contrast, there is no evidence that debt Granger-causes 
real capital expenditure when the variables are expressed as ratios to GDP but only in levels. The 
inconclusive result only for real series, unscaled by GDP, reinforces the view that higher capital 
expenditure triggers convergent paths for the debt to GDP ratio primarily because it tends, per se, to 
reduce the after-growth real interest rate. 
 Table 9b presents the Granger-causality results for the PIIGS group of countries. Capital 
expenditure is confirmed strongly to help predict public debt. The effects of public debt on capital 
expenditure are now weaker. 
 Taken in conjunction with the results from Table 8, the Granger-causality tests from Tables 
9a and 9b show that higher public capital expenditure tends to be associated with lower, and not 
with higher, public debt. These results are especially important in the light of the current policy 
debate on the most effective measures to take in order to achieve fiscal consolidation in the 
European Union. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Whereas EU fiscal austerity measures aim to guarantee debt consolidation in the aftermath of the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2012, this paper shows direct evidence of stabilizing effects induced 
by expansions in public capital expenditure. Increases in the ratio of capital expenditure to GDP 
ratio cause reductions in the ratio of debt to GDP in the long run. This empirical finding emerges 
from panel cointegration analysis applied to fifteen EU countries and the subset of PIIGS countries 
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over the sample period from 1980 to 2013, and appears particularly pronounced over the period 
from 1993 to 2013. 
Therefore, the paper shows how “fiscal discipline” may be conceptually different from 
“fiscal austerity”: fiscal discipline does not necessarily require expenditure-based fiscal austerity. 
The paper’s results are consistent with the view that the EU fiscal consolidation process should 
explicitly control for the composition of public expenditure. Rising public investment stimulates the 
long-run rate of economic growth and thus fosters convergence in debt-GDP ratios, ruling out the 
possible occurrence of high debt-austerity traps. 
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Appendix. Variables definitions and sources. 
 
 
 
Original Series AMECO codes 
General Government consolidated gross debt, 
Excessive Deficit procedure(based on ESA 
1995) and former definition (linked series) 
(% of GDP) 
UDGGL 
UDGGF 
General Government debt (level) UDGGL 
UDGGF 
General Government capital expenditure UIGG 
UKOG 
General Government Current expenditure UDTG 
Real General Government Current Expenditure OCTG 
Gross Domestic Product (current prices)  UVGD 
GDP Deflator PVGD 
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Figure 1. Major fiscal variables (ratios to GDP).  
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Figure 2. Major fiscal variables (constant 2005 prices). 
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Table 1a. Statistical Summary of Major Fiscal Variables – Ratios to GDP (1980-2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government  debt                   Capital Expenditure  
Country Mean 1980 
value 
2013 
value 
 n Mean 1980 
value 
2013 
value 
n 
         
         
Austria 60.01 35.41 74.83 34 4.61 6.21 3.950 34 
Belgium 108.5 74.00 100.4 34 3.60 5.74 2.710 34 
Denmark 56.09 39.08 42.27 34 2.59 3.59 2.970 34 
Finland 35.91 11.33 58.39 34 3.63 4.25 2.910 34 
France 52.36 20.73 93.49 34 4.19 4.16 4.070 34 
Germany 55.00 30.31 79.55 34 3.68 5.57 2.390 34 
Greece 90.38 22.50 176.2 34 4.90 1.85 14.55 34 
Ireland 68.18 73.47 124.3 34 4.96 5.49 2.800 34 
Italy 101.2 56.63 132.9 34 4.23 4.44 3.190 34 
Luxembourg 9.400 9.900 24.52 34 5.17 6.50 4.770 34 
Netherlands 63.21 63.85 74.84 34 4.46 6.24 3.410 34 
Norway 32.92 47.00 27.10 34 3.56 4.60 3.110 34 
Portugal 62.34 29.52 127.8 34 3.45 4.68 2.780 34 
Spain 49.92 16.45 94.77 34 4.38 1.84 2.420 34 
UK 50.03 51.95 94.30 34 2.97 3.69 2.800 34 
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Table 1b. Statistical Summary of Major Real Fiscal Variables (million euros, 1980-2013). 
 
 
 
?
?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Government Debt                    Capital Expenditure 
 
Country 
 
Mean 
 
1980 
value 
 
2013 
value 
 
n 
 
Mean 
 
1980 
value 
 
2013 
value 
 
n 
         
         
Austria 126.73 48.36 204.02 34 9.040 8.60 10.78 34 
Belgium 274.90 134.0 328.95 34 8.830 10.5 8.880 34 
Denmark 94.900 47.70 92.570 34 4.500 4.41 6.220 34 
Finland 48.066 9.820 97.050 34 4.410 3.55 4.840 34 
France 810.01 211.4 1694.8 34 60.50 42.8 73.83 34 
Germany 1007.7 1117 1975.4 34 68.45 72.4 59.28 34 
Greece 143.24 25.65 285.08 34 3.877 7.61 23.54 34 
Ireland 68.960 29.56 208.66 34 5.740 2.42 4.700 34 
Italy 1278.0 508.8 1813.5 34 51.69 40.8 43.45 34 
Luxembourg 2.1900 0.940 8.3200 34 1.110 0.62 1.620 34 
Netherlands 266.22 125.1 405.82 34 18.11 17.4 18.50 34 
Norway 65.640 55.90  73.950 34 6.770 5.47 8.400 34 
Portugal 80.650 22.50 190.21 34 5.730 3.77 4.130 34 
Spain 364.74 69.64 872.84 34 32.06 8.10 22.27 34 
UK 749.30 542.8 1836.6 34 43.49 35.3 54.52 34 
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between General Government Debt and Capital 
   Expenditure – Ratios to GDP and Real Values. 
 
 
Country Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Ratios to 
GDP) 
Correlation 
Type 
(Ratios to 
GDP) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Real 
Variables) 
Correlation 
Type 
(Real 
Variables) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
-0.73 
-0.31 
-0.17 
-0.28 
-0.24 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 0.30 
-0.40 
-0.16 
 0.61 
 0.87 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
-0.43 
 0.62 
  -0.05 
  -0.68 
-0.12 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 0.08 
 0.72 
 0.40 
 0.12 
 0.64 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
 0.05 
-0.28 
-0.59 
 0.41 
0.21 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive  
 
 0.33 
0.66 
0.28 
0.66 
0.49 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
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Table 3a. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of Government Debt to GDP1. 
 
  ADF ADF PP2 PP2 KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value t-stat P-value LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarityc 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.310 
-3.033 
-3.237 
-3.792 
-3.529 
0.0227 
0.0424 
0.0269 
0.0072 
0.0135 
-3.035 
-2.995 
-3.147 
-2.656 
-3.442 
0.0422 
0.0460  
0.0330 
0.0926 
0.0166 
0.355601*** 
0.378097*** 
0.228541*** 
0.081416***  
0.155890*** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.150 
-5.411 
-1.879 
-2.557 
-1.676 
0.0028 
0.0001 
0.3373 
0.1121 
0.4326 
-4.484 
-5.412 
-1.963 
-2.557 
-4.703 
0.0012 
0.0001 
0.0488 
0.1121 
0.0007 
0.151124*** 
0.163692*** 
0.226473*** 
0.183831*** 
0.500688* 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.217 
-4.778 
-2.864 
-2.155 
-2.574  
0.0281 
0.0005 
0.0608 
0.2257  
0.1088 
-3.116 
-4.762 
-2.871 
-2.204 
-1.832 
0.0353 
0.0006 
0.0599 
0.2085 
0.0643 
0.196689*** 
0.163463*** 
0.303228*** 
0.132496*** 
0.373120*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739(1 per 
cent level), 0.463(5 per cent level) and 0.347(10 per cent level) for the LM test for level stationarity. 
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Table 3b. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of General Government Capital 
   Expenditure to GDP1. 
?
  ADF ADF PP2 PP2 KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value t-stat P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarityc 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-6.7800 
-12.129 
-3.2646 
-5.9001 
-6.3516 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0256 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-14.775 
-11.773 
-6.4001 
-7.0531 
-6.5316 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.081832*** 
0.256586*** 
0.180110*** 
0.176219*** 
0.075324*** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1990-2013  
-6.6183 
-2.1443 
-4.4064 
-9.5802 
-7.1815  
0.0000 
0.0327 
0.0016 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-14.621 
-2.0848 
-12.578 
-10.239 
-7.3456 
0.0000 
0.0374 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.484848** 
0.210071*** 
0.245524*** 
0.113081*** 
0.120760*** 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-8.7231 
-4.6389 
-6.5228 
-8.3192 
-7.0340 
0.0000 
0.0008 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-21.591 
-4.8908 
-11.030 
-8.7200 
-7.4641 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.500000* 
0.083621*** 
0.500000* 
0.344715*** 
0.096420*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per 
cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM test for 
level stationarity. 
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Table 4a. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of Real Government Debt  
   (2005 prices)1. 
 
  ADF ADF PP2 PP2 KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value Adj-t-stat 
 
P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarityc 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.9255 
-2.0227 
-3.5002 
-3.4115 
-3.5007 
0.0051 
0.0538 
0.0148 
0.0188 
0.0145 
-3.6762 
-2.8282 
-2.5832 
-2.6301 
-3.5396 
0.0095 
0.0656 
0.1068 
0.0976  
0.0132 
0.080606*** 
0.389174** 
0.260809*** 
0.089390*** 
0.402596** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.5331 
-6.4281 
-1.8924 
-4.3926 
-1.5808 
0.0010 
0.0000 
0.3315 
0.0015 
0.4801 
-4.3658 
-8.1481 
-1.5615 
-4.3926 
-5.4604 
0.0016 
0.0000 
0.1097 
0.0015 
0.0001 
0.146644*** 
0.500000* 
0.313943***  
0.270087***  
0.565418*  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.6455 
-1.8674 
-2.6357 
-2.0017 
-3.5236 
0.0008 
0.3424 
0.0965 
0.2847 
0.0137 
-4.6931 
-5.3978 
-2.7055 
-2.0651 
-3.5236 
0.0007 
0.0001 
0.0841 
0.2593 
0.0137 
0.188150*** 
0.122461*** 
0.441240**  
0.184810***  
0.451746* 
? 
?
Notes: 
 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin(1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739(1 per 
cent level), 0.463(5 per cent level) and 0.347(10 per cent level) and 0.347(10 per cent level) for the LM test for 
level stationarity.  
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Table 4b. Stationarity Tests for First Difference of Real General Government Capital 
  Expenditure (2005 prices)1. 
 
  ADF ADF PP2 PP2 KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value Adj t-stat P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarityc 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-7.3831 
-11.522 
-3.8478 
-6.3081 
-5.6303 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0063 
0.0000 
0.0001 
-19.8953 
-12.1726 
-7.22843 
-11.8476 
-5.64020 
0.0001  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.064667*** 
0.500000* 
0.452421** 
0.385399**  
0.074498***  
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1990-2013  
-6.6230 
-3.7544 
-4.3360 
-9.1403 
-7.6925 
0.0000 
0.0081 
0.0019 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-12.8462 
-1.35829 
-11.7875 
-9.20968 
-7.99947 
0.0000 
0.5899 
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0000  
0.349670** 
0.251300*** 
0.204542*** 
0.155646*** 
0.127239***  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-8.4787 
-5.2641 
-5.8324 
-8.8622 
-6.7754 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000  
-21.2927 
-6.81477 
-6.35522 
-8.88172 
-7.17743 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.500000* 
0.120693*** 
0.339881*** 
0.300629***  
0.088329*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel c-The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739(1 per cent level), 0.463(5 per cent level) and 0.347(10 per cent level) 
and 0.347(10 per cent level) for the LM test for level stationarity. 
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Table 5a. Tests for Structural Change in the First Difference of Government Debt to GDP 
  (1980-2013). 
 
                               Zivot  and Andrews (1992)       Lumsdaine and Papell (1997)?
   
Country         Lags    t-stata Break 
date 
Break 
Date 
TB1 
Break 
Date 
TB2 
tstatb-
value 
TB1 
tb-stat 
value 
TB2 
pb-
value 
TB1 
pb-
value 
TB2 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
-3.6594** 
-3.1389*** 
-4.0929** 
-5.4080*** 
-3.6670* 
2000 
2008 
2000 
1991 
2006 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1993 
1993 
2010 
2009 
2006 
2010 
2007 
-1.9191 
-5.8552 
-6.1490 
-4.7446 
  2.0525 
0.2326 
2.9855 
5.7225 
2.2642 
3.4742 
0.0675 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0517 
0.8181 
0.0066 
0.0000 
0.0333 
0.0021 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
-4.8710*** 
-2.6030 
-3.8928 
-2.3946 
-3.0290*** 
1995 
2006 
2004 
1991 
2008 
1985 
2009 
1992 
1993 
1989 
1996 
2011 
2006 
2007 
2007 
  2.7340 
  1.5846 
 -5.1844 
 -2.6397 
  0.4701 
1.9844 
-1.930 
5.2778 
3.6837 
4.9130 
0.0118 
0.1267 
0.0000 
0.0146 
0.6427 
0.0637 
0.0660 
0.0000 
0.0012 
0.0001 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-3.3963*** 
-5.5293*** 
-3.6745 
-1.9903 
-5.0691 
2008 
2006 
2007 
1992 
2005 
 
1998 
2002 
1999 
1994 
1989 
2009 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2007 
 -1.6440 
  2.7332 
  3.6383 
 -6.2767 
  0.5400 
1.3852 
-4.365 
4.4095 
6.8603 
3.9079 
0.1138 
0.0108 
0.0014
0.0000 
0.5943 
0.1793 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0007 
?
?
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding, only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
5. In case of the debt/GDP values for each country, it can be seen that common breaks from the test are found in case 
of Austria for 1993-94, 1992-1994 for Denmark, 1995-96 for Germany, 1992 for Italy, 1994-1997 for Norway. 
Since, the common break period is early 1990’s we can conclude that in general, a break in the panel of the 
countries altogether would be between 1992-1994.  
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Table 5b. Tests for Structural Change in the Ratio of General Government Capital 
  Expenditure to GDP (1980-2013). 
 
                                                   Zivot   and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags            t-stat Break 
date 
Break 
date 1 
Break 
date 2 
t-stat 
TB1 
t-stat 
TB2 
P-
value 1 
P-value 
2b 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
0 
1 
4 
0 
0 
-7.1243*** 
-4.4639 
-2.9300 
-5.1887*** 
-4.7843*** 
2004 
1989 
2005 
1997 
1996 
1986 
1986 
1993 
1996 
1989 
2005 
1991 
2007 
2001 
1997 
-4.217 
-2.719 
-1.662 
-4.959 
 1.435 
1.432 
2.753 
3.228 
4.854 
-1.09 
0.0003 
0.0122 
0.1099 
0.0001 
0.1646 
0.1656 
0.0113 
0.0037 
0.0001 
0.2852 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
-6.4900** 
-2.6298 
-5.1135** 
-3.3014** 
-4.3567** 
1997 
1990 
2008 
2003 
1988 
1996 
1989 
1991 
1987 
1992 
2002 
2011 
2007 
2004 
2003 
-10.64 
 0.225 
 3.901 
-3.081 
-2.514 
10.04 
6.499 
3.713 
-0.88 
0.397 
0.0000 
0.8238 
0.0051 
0.0053 
0.0194 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0011 
0.3841 
0.6947 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-5.7229 
-4.0452** 
-4.8730* 
-3.8449* 
-4.2797*** 
1997 
1995 
1996 
1990 
2008 
1991 
1991 
1987 
1990 
1998 
1999 
2005 
2003 
2010 
2009 
 0.936 
-3.827 
 3.653 
1.540 
2.332 
-0.33 
3.392 
-3.99 
-2.89 
-3.47 
0.3588 
0.0009 
0.0013 
0.1372 
0.0288 
0.7380 
0.0025 
0.0006 
0.0082 
0.0021 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
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Table 5c. Tests for Structural Change in the Real Government Debt (2005 prices) 
   1980-2013).  
 
                                    Zivot   and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags    t-stata Break 
date 
Break 
Date 
TB1 
Break 
Date 
TB2 
t-stat 
value 
TB1 
t-stat 
value 
TB2 
Pb-
value 
TB1 
Pb-value 
TB2 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-3.8902*** 
-2.4078 
-4.5065** 
-4.7388*** 
-3.5718* 
2003 
1986 
1992 
1992 
2006 
1986 
1997 
1993 
1993 
1987 
2006 
2009 
2006 
2008 
2007 
  2.994 
-2.3071 
-4.8036 
  0.616 
  4.744 
2.3008 
0.0002 
4.9997 
5.3566 
4.2496 
0.0065 
0.0304 
0.0001 
0.5434 
0.0001 
0.0308 
0.9998 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0003 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
-3.2524* 
-3.9735 
-4.3959** 
-3.4914** 
-3.9676* 
1994 
1988 
2005 
1993 
2005 
1989 
1986 
1991 
1985 
1991 
2002 
2007 
2007 
1994 
2008 
  3.781 
  4.617 
-3.085 
 3.1943 
 7.0824 
-0.4786 
 3.8536 
 5.5887 
-2.5470 
 7.5902 
0.0010 
0.0001 
0.0052 
0.0040 
0.0000 
0.6367 
0.0008 
0.0000 
0.0180 
0.0000 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
-2.0787** 
-3.6941** 
-5.1974* 
-2.4698** 
-3.9409 
2000 
2006 
2006 
2005 
2007 
 
2001 
1991 
1985 
1994 
1996 
2009 
2007 
2007 
2008 
2008 
 1.1618 
 3.4792 
3.9074 
-2.7135 
1.1664 
-0.9587 
-4.7617 
 4.4516 
5.5433 
5.1322 
0.1192 
0.0020 
0.0007 
0.0124 
0.2554 
0.3476 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
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Table 5d. Tests for Structural Change in the Real General Government Capital 
   Expenditure (2005 prices) (1980-2013). 
 
                                                   Zivot and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags            t-stat Break 
date 
Break 
date 1 
Break 
date 2 
t-stat 
DT1 
t-stat 
DT2 
P-value 
DT1 
P-value 
DT2b 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
-7.7396*** 
-4.6341 
-2.9249 
-6.1481 
-3.5833*** 
2004 
1989 
2006 
1997 
1996 
1994 
1986 
1993 
1985 
1989 
2005 
1991 
2008 
1998 
1997 
-4.795 
-1.909 
  0.686 
  4.000 
  2.308 
 3.195 
 2.262 
 3.249 
-2.384 
-0.987 
0.0001 
0.0687 
0.4992 
0.0006 
0.0303 
0.0040 
0.0334 
0.0035 
0.0257 
0.3338 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
-6.5608** 
-4.3751 
-5.1976*** 
-3.2380** 
-5.6460*** 
1997 
1990 
2008 
2006 
2002 
1996 
1988 
1996 
1998 
1991 
2002 
1995 
2008 
2007 
2003 
-7.907 
 2.885 
 4.924 
 2.416 
2.190 
 
 7.586 
-2.015 
 4.219 
-3.917 
-1.754 
0.0000 
0.0083 
0.0001 
0.0240 
0.0389 
0.0000 
0.0557 
0.0003 
0.0007 
0.0927 
 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-5.5445** 
-4.1621** 
-4.0254* 
-4.1413*** 
-4.6761*** 
2008 
2000 
1997 
2008 
2008 
1996 
1988 
1987 
1986 
2001 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2009 
2009 
-3.904 
 3.224 
 5.666 
2.977 
5.1873 
4.6038 
1.2484 
-5.371 
-4.393 
-6.193 
0.0007 
0.0194 
0.0000 
0.0067 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.2244 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0000 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
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Table 6a. Panel Unit Root Tests (EU(15)) (1980-2013). 
 
Panel Data  Levin, 
Lin & 
Chu 
Breitung 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran 
and Shin  
W-stat 
ADF - 
Fisher  
Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher
Chi-square
Hadri  
Z-stat 
Government 
Debt/GDP 
 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
-5.9935 
(0.0000) 
 
-6.72257 
(0.0000) 
 
-3.78995 
(0.0001) 
 
-1.96109 
(0.0249) 
 
-5.9435 
(0.0000) 
 
-12.7160 
(0.0000) 
93.3359 
(0.0000) 
 
196.794 
(0.0000) 
117.632 
(0.0000) 
 
1882.22 
(0.0000) 
7.68810 
(0.0000) 
 
8.78881 
(0.0000) 
 
Real 
Debt 
 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
-4.99982 
(0.0000) 
 
-7.05209 
(0.0000) 
 
-2.92713 
(0.0017) 
 
-2.30042 
(0.0107) 
 
-4.45810 
(0.0000) 
 
-13.0893 
(0.0000) 
 
72.2731 
(0.0001) 
 
200.281 
(0.0000) 
 
331.086 
(0.0001) 
 
1534.26 
(0.0000) 
 
5.38560 
(0.0000) 
 
7.12414 
(0.0000)  ?
Notes  
 
1. ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi –square distribution.  
2. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
3. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC, Newey-West bandwidth selection using a 
Bartlett Kernel. 
4. Ten cross-sections used in each test. The Levin, Lin & Chu t test uses 290 observations, 
Breitung-stat used 280 observations, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF-Fischer chi square 
used 290 observations, PP-Fischer chi-square used 300 observations Finally, Hadri-z stat 
used 310 observations. Hadri z-stat assumes no unit root in the process while the other 
tests assume unit root as the null. 
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Table 6b. Panel Unit Root Tests (PIIGS) (1980-2013). 
 
 
Panel Data  Levin, 
Lin & 
Chu 
Breitung t-
stat 
Im, Pesaran
and Shin  
W-stat 
ADF - 
Fisher Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher 
Chi-square 
Hadri Z-
stat 
 
Government 
Debt/GDP 
 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
 
-1.07939 
(0.1402) 
 
-6.67648 
(0.0000) 
 
 
-1.09468 
(0.1368) 
 
1.67924 
(0.9534) 
 
-1.97301 
(0.0242) 
 
-11.1846 
(0.0000) 
 
19.1127 
(0.0389) 
 
119.950 
(0.0000) 
 
34.1077 
(0.0002) 
 
698.408 
(0.0000) 
 
4.9985 
(0.0000) 
 
5.09028 
(0.0000) 
 
Real 
Debt 
 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
-2.33511 
(0.0098) 
 
-2.98446 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.98982 
(0.1611) 
 
 1.69503 
 (0.9550) 
 
-3.92859 
(0.0000) 
 
-9.52363 
(0.0000) 
 
35.1202 
(0.0001) 
 
107.903 
(0.0000) 
 
241.643 
(0.0000) 
 
255.636 
(0.0000) 
 
3.14924 
(0.0008) 
 
0.72744 
(0.2335) 
 
Notes  
 
1. ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi –square 
distribution.  
2. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
3. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC, Newey-West bandwidth selection using a 
Bartlett Kernel. 
4. Five cross-sections used in each test. The Levin, Lin & Chu t test uses 145 observations, 
Breitung-stat used 140 observations, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF-Fischer chi 
square used 145 observations, PP-Fischer chi-square used 150 observations Finally, 
Hadri-z stat used 155 observations. Hadri z-stat assumes no unit root in the process while 
the other tests assume unit root as the null. 
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Table 7a. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1980-2013). 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
0.895 
(0.18) 
 
0.9499 
(0.828) 
 
0.2312 
(0.5914) 
 
-0.2920 
(0.385) 
 
2.3485 
(0.990) 
 
1.6032 
(0.9456)  
 
-0.0882 
(0.4648) 
 
82.51 
(0.0000) 
 
53.91 
(0.0047) 
 
- 0.79935 
  (0.2120) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
4.220 
(0.00) 
 
0.9855 
(0.837) 
 
0.4723 
(0.6817) 
 
-0.4689 
(0.319) 
 
2.3022 
(0.989) 
 
1.8367 
(0.9666) 
 
0.0870 
(0.5347) 
 
78.62 
(0.0000) 
 
47.21 
(0.0237) 
 
1.17574 
(0.1198) 
 
 
 
Table 7b. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1980-1991). 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
3.859 
(0.00) 
 
2.4923 
(0.993) 
 
0.9952 
(0.8402) 
 
-1.2885 
(0.098) 
 
3.2770 
(0.999) 
 
0.57523 
(0.7174) 
 
-1.2984 
(0.0971) 
 
104.6 
(0.0000) 
 
80.84 
(0.0000) 
 
- 1.97613 
  (0.0241)
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
-0.55 
(0.71) 
 
0.3344 
(0.631) 
 
-1.46686 
(0.0710) 
 
-1.5777 
(0.057) 
 
0.8666 
(0.806) 
 
-2.2845 
(0.0112) 
 
-1.47708 
(0.0698) 
 
63.66 
(0.0003) 
 
54.32 
(0.0042) 
 
-1.0301 
(0.1515) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7c. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1993-2013). 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
-1.65 
(0.95) 
 
-6.4283 
(0.000) 
 
-5.28514 
(0.0000) 
 
-4.9892 
(0.000) 
 
-0.7070 
(0.239) 
 
-1.9546 
(0.0253) 
 
-3.16317 
(0.008) 
 
82.48 
(0.0000) 
 
53.93 
(0.0047) 
 
- 1.9864 
  (0.0235)
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
-1.57 
(0.94) 
 
-7.2239 
(0.000) 
 
-5.65661 
(0.0000) 
 
-5.6208 
(0.000) 
 
-0.5475 
(0.292) 
 
-1.5739 
(0.0577) 
 
-2.21056 
(0.0135) 
 
59.66 
(0.0010) 
 
41.40 
(0.0804) 
 
1.78673 
(0.0370) 
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Table 7d. Summary Panel Cointegration (PIIGS) (1980-2013). 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
0.373 
(0.35) 
 
-0.8643 
(0.139) 
 
-0.9028 
(0.1833) 
 
-1.4305 
(0.076) 
 
0.2890 
(0.613) 
 
-0.1579 
(0.4372) 
 
0.1011 
(0.5403) 
 
35.23 
(0.0001) 
 
20.76 
(0.0228) 
 
- 0.93003 
  (0.1762)
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
0.535 
(0.29) 
 
-0.329 
(0.370) 
 
0.1816 
(0.5721) 
 
-0.4689 
(0.077) 
 
1.3895 
(0.917) 
 
1.6186 
(0.9472) 
 
-1.5084 
(0.0657) 
 
16.92 
(0.0076) 
 
26.39 
(0.0032) 
 
1.75481 
(0.0396) 
 
 
 
Table 7e. Summary Panel Cointegration (PIIGS) (1993-2013). 
 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
-0.7738 
(0.7805) 
 
-1.7143 
(0.0432) 
 
-1.0735 
(0.1415) 
 
-1.8474 
(0.0323) 
 
0.7530 
(0.7743) 
 
0.8362 
(0.7985) 
 
-1.9395 
(0.0262) 
 
62.75 
(0.0000) 
 
16.48 
(0.0867) 
 
 1.0130 
(0.1555) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
1.4033 
(0.0803) 
 
-2.1141 
(0.0172) 
 
-2.3045 
(0.0106) 
 
-3.8065 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.7728 
(0.2198) 
 
-1.4516 
(0.0733) 
 
-3.8282 
(0.0001) 
 
38.03 
(0.0002) 
 
19.56 
(0.0337) 
 
-3.1301 
(0.0009) 
 
Note: 
p-values in brackets. 
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Table 8. Summary Panel Cointegration (1980-2013) – Kao FMOLS Coefficients. 
 
 
Variables EU(15) 
(1980-2013) 
EU(15) 
(1980-1991) 
 
EU(15) 
(1993-2013) 
PIIGS 
(1980-2013) 
PIIGS 
(1993-2013) 
Govt Debt/GDP & 
Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
-0.04818 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.16979 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.15859 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.07169 
(0.0062) 
 
-0.02971 
(0.4502) 
 
Real Debt & Real 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
-0.03001 
(0.1614) 
 
-0.17483 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.03737 
(0.1863) 
 
-0.03002 
(0.2441) 
 
-0.5789 
(0.0000) 
 
Note: 
p-values in brackets. 
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Table 9a. Granger Causality Test EU(15) Panel. 
 
Panel Data (EU15) F-statistic 
(1980-2013) 
F-statistic 
(1993-2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Capital 
Expenditure/GDP does not 
Granger Cause Debt/GDP 
 
 
3.69729 
(0.0255) 
 
2.30085 
(0.1021) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Debt/GDP 
does not Granger Cause Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
0.46977 
(0.6254) 
 
0.00561 
(0.9944) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Capital 
Expenditure does not Granger 
Cause Real Debt 
 
 
6.18080 
(0.0000) 
 
15.1377 
(0.0000) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Debt does 
not Granger Cause Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
3.82761 
(0.0005) 
 
9.7320 
(0.0000) 
 
Table 9b. Granger Causality Test (PIIGS) Panel. 
 
Panel Data (PIIGS) F-statistic 
(1980-2013) 
F-statistic 
(1993-2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Capital 
Expenditure/GDP does not 
Granger Cause Debt/GDP 
 
 
10.0059 
(0.0019) 
 
2.29256 
(0.1068) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Debt/GDP 
does not Granger Cause Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
0.01901 
(0.8905) 
 
0.20935 
(0.8815) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Capital 
Expenditure does not Granger 
Cause Real Debt 
 
 
17.5153 
(0.0000) 
 
7.83929 
(0.0007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Debt does 
not Granger Cause Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
3.05578 
(0.0823) 
 
1.05138 
(0.3537) 
 
Note: 
p-values in brackets. 
 
